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ABSTRACT
The sensors of a context-aware system extract contextual
information from the environment and relay that informa-
tion to higher-level processes of the system so to influence
the system’s control decisions. However, an adversary can
maliciously influence such controls indirectly by manipu-
lating the environment in which the sensors are monitor-
ing, thereby granting privileges the adversary would other-
wise not normally have. To address such context monitor-
ing issues, we extend CASSEC by incorporating sentience-
like constructs, which enable the emulation of “confidence”,
into our proximity-based access control model to grant the
system the ability to make more inferable decisions based
on the degree of reliability of extracted contextual informa-
tion. In CASSEC 2.0, we evaluate our confidence constructs
by implementing two new authentication mechanisms. Co-
proximity authentication employs our time-based challenge-
response protocol, which leverages Bluetooth Low Energy
beacons as its underlying occupancy detection technology.
Biometric authentication relies on the accelerometer and
fingerprint sensors to measure behavioral and physiologi-
cal user features to prevent unauthorized users from using
an authorized user’s device. We provide a feasibility study
demonstrating how confidence constructs can improve the
decision engine of context-aware access control systems.
Keywords
Access Control; Context Awareness; BYOD; Security; Mo-
bility; Biometric; Authentication; Reliability; Proximity
1. INTRODUCTION
Context-aware access control systems aim to secure ac-
cess to sensitive resources by adapting their access autho-
rizations to the current context without explicit user in-
tervention. In fact, enterprise organizations have adopted
context-aware systems that leverage proximity-based access
control (PrBAC) to mitigate threats of information leak-
age. That is, access control decisions are not solely based
on the requesting user’s location, but also on the location of
other users in the physical space. In our previous paper [30],
we introduced a secure, automated PrBAC architecture and
prototype system that we referred to as the Context-Aware
System to Secure Enterprise Content (CASSEC). CASSEC
addressed two proximity-based scenarios often encountered
in enterprise environments (c.f. Section 2): Separation of
Duty (SoD) and Absence of Other Users (AOU).
To address such access control scenarios, CASSEC took a
wireless, infrastructure-based approach to achieve the local-
ization of occupants within a monitored space which enables
geo-spatial RBAC [9, 22]. A wireless, infrastructure-based
approach makes the system more resilient to malicious at-
tacks; we assumed, for example, the least amount of trust
in users since users may attempt to circumvent the access
control process by not manually reporting their location or
providing false location data. In addition, the architectural
model allowed a fluid context-sensitive authorization pro-
cess, thereby enabling zero interaction authorization (i.e., it
did not require user intervention). While our system was
agnostic with respect to the technological choices for de-
tecting physical proximity, we had provided a simple im-
plementation of the complete CASSEC architecture. We
utilized Bluetooth and WiFi devices, which are widely used
in enterprise environments, to address the occupancy detec-
tion problem [17], and therefore, no additional hardware was
needed to deploy our system. We first showed how to enforce
SoD by using Bluetooth MAC addresses of Client devices of
nearby occupants as proof-of-location. That is, we extracted
the MAC address from these devices to determine who was
in a given space. We then showed how to enforce AOU by
exploiting the degradation of WiFi received signal strength
as a result of human-induced interference when people are
near access points. That is, we utilized WiFi-capable devices
to determine how many people were in a given space. With
such information obtained passively by a Proximity Module
(PM), the Authorization Server (AS) component was able
to enforce PrBAC policies whenever an authenticated Client
requested from the Enterprise Content Server (ECS) compo-
nent access to resources depending on the presence, or lack
thereof, of users. Our approach was the first to incorporate
WiFi signal interference caused by occupants as part of a
PrBAC system. Figure 1 displays CASSEC’s architectural
components.
The previous approach, however, has several drawbacks.
First, it does not take into account the phenomena of ra-
dio signals permeating through walls. Multiple proximity
modules residing in adjacent proximity zones would simulta-
neously detect the same Bluetooth-enabled Client, when in
fact, the Client only existed in one of said proximity zones.
As a result, such a benign occurrence is automatically in-
ferred as malicious activity. Given that Bluetooth’s omni-
directional transmission range is 10m (∼33 ft), the number
of false attack detections may increase in standard enter-
prise settings, such as small offices or conference rooms.
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Figure 1: CASSEC’s Proximity-based access con-
trol architecture. Arrows indicate wireless network
communication.
A non-negligible false detection rate is a major drawback
that hinders the practicality and ease-of-adoption of the so-
lution. Second, the system was susceptible to observable
Bluetooth manipulation (see Section 8), such as an unau-
thorized individual obtaining an authorized user’s phone,
whether by theft or voluntary provision. If such an attack
occurs, the unauthorized individual can gain access to re-
stricted resources s/he would normally otherwise not have
access to.
To address such context monitoring issues, we further in-
vestigate techniques that leverage existing contextual in-
formation from both the physical and computing realms.
Contextual information extracted from the environment can
help a context-aware system in inferring the situation of en-
tities within that environment. However, being able to infer
the correct or more probable conclusion w.r.t. the situation
of an entity highly depends on the reliability of the extracted
contextual information. Reliability could be measured, for
example, by the level of accuracy, precision, or security in
using a technique or technology (e.g., occupancy detection
or biometric authentication) to extract or process contextual
information. With respect to security, a context-aware sys-
tem may also need to adapt its access control decisions to the
degree of reliability of such information. Given the dynamic
nature of BYOD (Bring-Your-Own-Device) scenarios and
idiosyncratic phenomenon observed in occupancy detection
technologies (see Section 3), it is essential that context-aware
systems emulate a sentient characteristic when making in-
ferred decisions: confidence. Access control policies should
incorporate confidence constructs when specifying contex-
tual restrictions.
In this paper, we thus propose a major extension to CASSEC,
which we refer to as CASSEC 2.0, by adding confidence con-
structs to the location and role constructs in PrBAC poli-
cies. In addition, we conduct a feasibility study to show
that the approach is viable within an enterprise environ-
ment, which can be achieved via preexisting technologies
and solutions integrated within the enterprise’s mobile IT
infrastructure. Through the location construct, a policy can
specify that resource access authorization is granted only if
the context-aware system can determine to a specified prob-
ability that a user is in a room. We employ Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE) capabilities of PMs and Clients to perform
continuous co-proximity authentication, and use BLE bea-
cons transmitted during this authentication phase to provide
a certain degree of confidence that the Client is in a partic-
ular proximity zone, even when multiple PMs in adjacent
rooms detect the same Client. Through the role construct,
a policy can specify that access to resources is only granted
if the system can determine with high confidence whether
the current user of a Client device is the true owner of the
device. We leverage accelerometer and fingerprint sensors
within smartphones to achieve behavioral and physiological
biometric authentication. Behavioral biometric authentica-
tion is achieved by passively analyzing the gait patterns of
the Client’s current user via the smartphone’s accelerometer.
Although human gait is behavioral and resistant to signifi-
cant change over time, various factors can slightly influence
the extracted gait features at runtime [26]. Consequently, if
the Client cannot passively identify the current user through
runtime gait measurements with high levels of assurance,
the Client will take an active approach and request the user
to authenticate him/herself via the fingerprint sensor (i.e.,
physiological biometric authentication) when the user next
requests access to resources.
The CASSEC 2.0 system has thus the following contribu-
tions:
1. Confidence Constructs: We incorporate confidence spec-
ifiers into context-based access control policies. More
specifically, we incorporate such specifiers into PrBAC’s
role and location constructs, thereby enabling the CASSEC
2.0 system to factor in the degree of reliability of con-
textual information during authentication and autho-
rization processes.
2. Feasibility Study: We conduct a feasibility study to
show that the approach of CASSEC 2.0 is viable in
a practical enterprise setting. We leverage solutions
within an enterprise’s preexisting IT infrastructure to
evaluate confidence constructs, and apply such con-
structs to biometric and co-proximity authentication.
3. Co-Proximity Authentication: We provide a timed challenge-
response protocol using BLE beacons as our underly-
ing co-proximity authentication technology. The pro-
tocol prevents an adversary, who has modified his de-
vice’s unique user ID, from impersonating another user.
However, our study shows that using distance-bounding
techniques over BLE beacons is a feasible defense only
against a sophisticated attacker able to execute relay
attacks under a certain adversarial model.
4. Biometric Authentication: We leverage behavioral and
physiological biometric authentication to evaluate con-
fidence specifiers. Our study shows that our approach
is feasible as we are able to verify that the current user
of the Client device is the true owner with high confi-
dence when the phone is placed on the hip and within
the pocket, respectively.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
proximity-based scenarios and specific examples that moti-
vate this work. We then briefly discuss background informa-
tion on occupation detection and biometric authentication
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techniques in Section 3. We provide in Section 4 a PrBAC
policy specification for CASSEC 2.0. Section 5 establishes
our system’s assumption. Section 6 introduces the architec-
ture and underlying components of our approach. Section
Section 7 discusses implementation details followed by a re-
port of data collected from our use case study. We analyze
the security of our approach in Section 8. Next, we discuss
relevant work in Section 9. Section 10 concludes the paper.
2. MOTIVATING SCENARIOS
Pervasive computing has enabled context-aware systems
to be leveraged in a variety of settings, including mobile
cloud services, hospitals, enterprises, and military organiza-
tions [15, 18, 33, 38]. In what follows we present scenarios
from [30] motivating the need for context-aware systems in
which access to sensitive resources must be controlled based
on proximity parameters.
Consider a military organization with monitored govern-
ment facilities such as restricted military bases or buildings.
Military personnel are assigned roles that reflect ranking
and privileges. The roles General and Private are assigned
to the highest- and lowest-ranking personnel in the army,
respectively. In terms of accessing restricted facilities or re-
sources, the former is granted many privileges, while the
latter has very few. Consider also the role Civilian, which
indicates an individual operating outside of the military or-
ganization, and who is granted no privileges. Suppose that
three military personnel, two Generals and one Private, are
granted access to documents classified up to the level of top
secret and restricted, respectively, according to a multi-level
security model.
Separation of Duty Scenario. A document classified as
top secret is highly sensitive, and requires that at least two
personnel with the role General be present in order for it to be
accessed. The document is accessed via desktop terminal and
is stored within a designated, but restricted office in which
only Generals are allowed to enter.
This scenario reflects the security principle SoD. That is, two
or more people are responsible for cooperatively completing
a task. In addition, the circumstances requires that said
document must be accessed at a specific location.
Absence of Other Users Scenario. A document clas-
sified as restricted, but with the additional caveat “for your
eyes only”, requires that a specific Private can access it via
smartphone mobile, however, only if no other individuals are
present at the time of access.
Such an absence-based restriction not only includes military
personnel of various rankings, but also individuals that as-
sume the role of Civilian. Civilians are often temporarily
recruited to work on military projects, but are highly mon-
itored and usually given only the set of privileges needed to
complete the project and nothing more. We note that, un-
like the SoD scenario, in this AOU scenario the document
can be accessed via the Private’s smartphone device in any
location including locations that Civilians may have access
to. Therefore, less infrastructure is required as it is not nec-
essary to know the identity of every person in the Private’s
vicinity.
3. BACKGROUND
3.1 Occupancy Detection
There is a variety of technologies that address the local-
ization problem, that is, to determine and retrieve a user’s
location. Generally, each positioning system has at least
two separate hardware components, a transmitter and a re-
ceiver to send and receive signals, respectively [40]. The re-
ceiver analyzes one of the following three characteristics of
the received signal: angle-of-arrival (AoA), received-signal
strength (RSS), and time of arrival (ToA). For example, the
most widely used technology in context-aware applications
is the Global Position System (GPS). It is a positioning tool
which uses the propagation time of signals (i.e., ToA) from
satellites to compute the position of a receiver anywhere
on Earth. Other positioning techniques with different tech-
nologies include Infrared (IR), Radio Frequency (RF), Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) [25], magnetic field [27], ul-
trasound [33], Bluetooth [11], and WiFi [7, 10,20,36,38].
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) can also be used to retrieve
a user’s relative location in an energy efficient manner, and
it has been employed by beaconing services [43]. By utiliz-
ing widely-used BLE-based beacon protocols (e.g., Apple’s
iBeacon, Google’s Eddystone, and AltBeacon [43]), a beacon
region or the proximity of other BLE-enabled beacon devices
(e.g., smartphones) can be detected. Detection is achieved
by periodically broadcasting beacons that are picked up by
BLE-enabled devices. We utilize Google’s implementation
as it is open source. Google’s beacon provides two mea-
surements. The distance measurement is an indicator of
the proximity of one device to another which is determined
based on the RSS value. The ranging measurement is an in-
tuitive, user-friendly indicator of the distance between two
devices which falls into one of the following ranges: Immedi-
ate (very close), Near (at a distance of 1-3m), Far (greater
than 3m), or Unknown (the distance cannot be accurately
determined). We also investigate other distance-bounding
techniques. In particular, we investigate techniques that
measure the time elapsed, i.e., the round trip time (RTT),
during the exchange of packets between the transmitter and
receiver. We implemented a distance-bounding system us-
ing BLE beacons as our underlying technology, which were
programmed using Android’s android.bluetooth.le APIs [4].
3.2 Biometric Authentication
Biometric information characterizes measurable human bi-
ological features [2]. Most biometric features are unique per
person and can be found in every individual. In the con-
text of security, biometric authentication refers to techniques
that rely on such features to uniquely identify and validate
the identity of an individual. Human biometrics can be clas-
sified into two types: physiological and behavioral. Physio-
logical biometric authentication is based on static physical
attributes such as fingerprints, iris, retina, or facial features,
whereas behavioral biometric authentication relies on iden-
tifiable characteristics of a user’s behavior that typically do
not change over time such as keystroke dynamics, signature,
or gait.
At a high level, biometric authentication has two phases:
enrollment and authentication. Before authentication can
occur, an individual must first be enrolled into the system by
extracting and storing his/her biometric data within a tem-
plate. Later in the authentication phase when the identity
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of the individual must be verified, the biometric data col-
lected at runtime is compared to the previously constructed
template. From this comparison, a similarity matching score
is produced, and whether an individual is accepted/rejected
(i.e., non-/identified) depends on a threshold set for the sys-
tem. In this paper, we employ both physiological and behav-
ioral biometric authentication for user verification using two
techniques: fingerprint and gait recognition. Modern mo-
bile devices already have integrated solutions to enroll and
authenticate users via fingerprint scanning technology [4].
However, such devices lack gait recognition solutions. We
therefore only describe user verification via gait recognition
below.
3.2.1 User Verification via Gait Recognition
Lee and Grimson defined gait as “an idiosyncratic feature
of a person that is determined by, among other things, an
individual’s weight, limb length, footwear, and posture com-
bined with characteristic motion. Hence, gait can be used as
a biometric measure to recognize known persons and clas-
sify unknown subjects” [26]. Empirical evidence supports
this definition as researchers have conducted experiments
which analyzed over 700 users’ gait patterns and found gait
patterns to be unique [29]. As a result, it is possible to verify
whether the user of a mobile device is the true owner of that
device.
Gait recognition for the purpose of user verification is not
novel [2], nor is it the focus of this paper. The main ap-
proaches to measuring and analyzing gait biometric are ma-
chine vision, floor sensor, and wearable sensor. Deploying
additional hardware incurs additional costs, as is the case in
the first two approaches. Fortunately, state-of-the-art cel-
lular devices are embedded with a set of sensors, including
accelerometers, which have now become a standard for mod-
ern smartphones. Consequently, we only employ a wearable
sensor approach. We leverage a recent work proposed by
Ren et al. [34] for several reasons: (1) it utilizes readily avail-
able accelerometers embedded within smartphones to detect
possible user spoofing in mobile healthcare systems; (2) it
takes into account the fact that computational resources are
limited on mobile devices; and (3) it is robust to variations
in users’ walking speed. See Section 6 for more details.
4. POLICY SPECIFICATION
Several research efforts have focused on the design of ac-
cess control policy languages [3, 9, 16, 23, 28, 32]. In this
section we introduce a simple, yet expressive policy speci-
fication (Table 1) that leverages existing policy languages.
We adopt the syntactical structure of XACML, which is
an XML-based language for access control, and apply it in
defining proximity-based RBAC policies for CASSEC. The
terms in quotes ’ ’ represent static tokens. The terms in
italics indicate functions.
As it is standard in RBAC policies, a role is a job function
that represents a set of privileges to perform actions on ob-
jects. An object is a data construct that is acted upon by a
subject that has assumed a role. An action is an appropri-
ate operation that can be applied to an object. We assume
that users of our system may be mobile, and therefore, we in-
corporate usage controls regarding continuity of access [32].
An obligation specifies that certain constraints must be sat-
isfied prior to or while accessing an object. A topology in-
dicates a relation between the role and the location within
Table 1: PrBAC POLICY LANGUAGE
<Policies> ::= ’Begin’ <policy-list> ’End’
<policy-list> ::= <policy> <policy-list> | <policy>
<policy> ::= <role-predicate> <object> <action>
(<context>)
<role-predicate> ::= <role> (<confidence>) | <rank-
ing>’(’<role>’)’ (<confidence>)
<confidence> ::= <digit>
<digit> ::= [’0’-’9’]
<ranking> ::= equal | inferior | superior
<action> ::= read | write | delete ...
<context> ::= <obligation> <location-constraint>
| <obligation> <location-constraint> <proximity-
constraints>
<obligation> ::= prior | while
<location-constraint> ::= <topology> <location>
(<confidence>)
<topology> ::= in | out | adjacent ...
<proximity-constraints> ::= <proximity-constraint>
<proximity-constraints> | <proximity-constraint>
<proximity-constraint> ::= <cardinality> <digit>
<role-predicate><location-constraint>
<cardinality> ::= at least | at most
the spatial domain. Often in enterprise environments, ac-
cess to restricted resources is contingent on not only the
presence (or absence) of other people, but the relation to-
wards the individual requesting access. A role-predicate
specifies a specific role or relational function that takes the
role of the requesting user and outputs a ranking relative
to that role (i.e., superior(roleOfRequestingUser)). Last, an
entity designated to enforce a policy may need prerequisites
to be fulfilled, at least to a certain in extent. A confidence
indicates the numerical threshold at which a requirement
must be fulfilled, otherwise anything below that threshold
is considered a policy violation. For example, specifying a
role (General) with a confidence constraint (80%) semanti-
cally states that the system must be “80%” sure that the
current user is the General. Figure 2 provides two examples
of access control policies to specify the restrictions in SoD
scenario and AOU scenario.
Figure 2: The policy on the left refers to the SoD
scenario: at least two Generals must be present in
order to access the TopSecretDocument. The policy
on the right refers to the AOU scenario: the Private
can access the ResctrictedDocument only if no one
else is around.
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5. THREATS AND ASSUMPTIONS
We make the following assumptions about the proposed
system and the adversary. Each user, including the adver-
sary, has full access to his/her device. Each device has been
preauthorized by the IT admin for BYOD use. Preautho-
rization consists of verifying that (1) the device supports
hardware-backed cryptographic key generation and storage
and (2) the device’s sensors, including Bluetooth, accelerom-
eter, and fingerprint sensors, are functioning correctly. Con-
sequently, we assume IT admins can be trusted. Each device
must generate asymmetric cryptographic keys via Androids
Hardware-Backed Keystore [4], in which the public key for
that device is uploaded to a server for later use while the
unexportable private key is stored securely in hardware. We
trust the Android access control system, which includes the
Android middleware and Linux Kernel, to correctly enforce
all security policies. Physical security or video monitoring
is employed to prevent the adversary from compromising
proximity modules and entering the environment with for-
eign objects such as a non-secured phone. We only consider
a passive adversary, and not active adversary. That is, the
adversary has control of the communication channel, but is
not able to inject new packets or compromise transmitted
packets. The adversary is only able to relay packets trans-
mitted between parties. In other words, the attacker posses
standard Dolev-Yao capabilities [14]. We assume each prox-
imity module has access to the public keys of Client devices,
which can be retrieved on demand or during the installation
of the proximity module.
6. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we describe our CASSEC 2.0 platform
that securely supports the SoD scenario and the AOU sce-
nario described in Section 2. We adhere to design goals
from the previous work, which include providing a secure,
automated, and generalized architecture with responsibili-
ties of each system component clearly defined. In CASSEC
2.0’s architecture, we assume the least amount of trusted
parties as possible. Our context-aware system proactively
monitors and collects information about the environment
in lieu of manual intervention by entities within that en-
vironment. Specifically, we do not rely on users, possibly
malicious, to manually report their location. Therefore, we
choose an infrastructure-based approach that uses wireless
hardware to localize occupants within a monitored space. In
the rest of the section, we define our interpretation of the
term proximity and then provide an overview of the archi-
tectural components of CASSEC and how they relate to our
access control framework.
6.1 Proximity Zone
We rely on geographical proximity, which indicates that
two entities are located within a certain distance in the phys-
ical space [18]. That is, in our work, proximity of a user is
defined by a region of space monitored by a proximity mod-
ule. The user must be within the region of space in order
to gain access. We refer to this region of monitored space
as a proximity zone. The level of precision in determining
the location of a user and the proximity of other users is
application dependent [10,17].
Figure 3: CASSEC’s access control framework com-
municating with our prototype proximity module.
6.2 Components
6.2.1 Access Control
Here we describe the architectural components tasked with
enforcing our PrBAC policies.
Enterprise Content Server (ECS): The ECS, which acts as
the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), delivers enterprise re-
sources to users who request access. By designing this com-
ponent as a server, a heterogeneous network of end-users’
devices can be serviced. Therefore, access to resources can
be requested from desktop terminals or mobile devices.
Authorization Server (AS): The AS hosts the access con-
trol decision-making engine of the authorization framework.
After a user has been authenticated by the AS via login
credentials, it returns an authentication token to the Client
device. The token, which is submitted to the ECS by the
Client, is used to associate an authenticated user with autho-
rized roles. The AS itself is composed of two sub-components:
Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Information Point
(PIP). We discuss in more detail the construction of the au-
thentication token and AS’s sub-components later in Section
6.3.
6.2.2 Contextual Information
In order to extract contextual information from the envi-
ronment, we take both an active and passive approach. We
use the terms active and passive to indicate whether or not
users are required to physically interact with the entity col-
lecting contextual information. The components involved in
contextual information acquisition are as follows:
Client: A Client is a device used to request access to a
resource by a user. If the request is granted, a user can
view the data on the device (e.g., desktop terminal or mo-
bile smartphone). Unlike their desktop counterparts, smart-
phone devices allow mobility with respect to embedded sen-
sors and network connectivity. Consequently, in our proto-
type system, we take an active approach to user verification
via biometric authentication by utilizing a smartphone as
the Client device. That is, the Client is also designated to
verify that the current user of the device is the true owner
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of the device. We note that solutions have been developed
that take a passive approach to the collection of biometric
features, which may be more secure. If we were to take a
passive approach to biometric authentication, the example
policies in Figure 2 would also include confidence thresholds
under the role specifier since the AS is designated to eval-
uate if policies are adhered to. We discuss this further in
Section 8.
Proximity Module (PM): The role of the PM is to collect
and analyze contextual information in order to detect the
proximity of users. This detection process occurs periodi-
cally, and proximity-related information is sent to the AS.
Although a PM is the set of physical devices that determine
proximity, we consider them as independent of the PIP as
the PIP is the entity that directly communicates with the
PDP. Users do not physically interact with the PM in our
prototype system, and therefore it is considered passive.
Our architectural components are shown in Figure 1. We
do not discuss cryptographic schemes to protect network
communication between the entities in our system model.
We assume that an underlying secure network infrastructure
is in place, as usual in enterprise environments. Although
the figure only shows one PM and consequently only one
proximity zone, in practice an enterprise building will have
multiple PMs, possibly one for each room.
6.3 Access Control Framework
The PDP is the specific entity that is delegated to make
access decisions. It maintains a database of PrBAC policies.
Given these policies, the PDP first verifies if someone is a
user of the system. The PDP then retrieves the latest in-
formation regarding the user’s location and the presence of
other users from the PIP. Such information allows the PDP
to determine the set of authorized geo-spatial roles if prox-
imity constraints are satisfied. Next, the PDP constructs
and returns to the Client an authentication token. The to-
ken, at minimum, contains a generated temporary ID. It
may also contain an expiration date. As such, the token is
utilized as a session identifier. Last, the PDP maintains a
database mapping of session IDs to the set of active autho-
rized geo-spatial roles for each user. This mapping is also
sent to the PEP each time a role is authorized.
The PEP’s role, implemented as part of the ECS, is to
enforce proximity restrictions for enterprise content. Dur-
ing a request, a Client submits an authentication token to
the ECS. The PEP extracts the temporary session ID from
the token. The PDP continually updates the PEP of map-
pings of session IDs to a set of active authorized geo-spatial
roles. First, the mapping makes it possible to enforce access
restrictions according to the roles associated with that ID.
Second, it also enables it to service multiple Client devices
simultaneously. Third, this design anonymizes users as the
PEP does not have any information that identifies users such
as locations and credentials.
The PIP’s role is to store and maintain contextual infor-
mation about an enterprise’s proximity zones. Each PM,
after co-proximity authentication of Clients, is required to
transmit four pieces of information to the PIP: a proximity
zone identifier, the number of people detected, a list of cap-
tured UIDs1 and corresponding RSS values of BLE beacons,
and a timestamp. The PIP then records the collected data
1We assume that each user of the system has an identifier
unique to that user.
into its context database. Instead of the PIP polling the
PM for information, we minimize communication by requir-
ing that the PM updates the AS only when characteristics of
the proximity zone changes. In addition, this clear designa-
tion of duties also minimizes overhead in both the PM and
AS. Considering the dynamic nature of the environment, the
PIP must update the PDP as frequently as the occurrences
of updates to the context database. Such updates allow the
PDP to continuously check for any instance of proximity-
based violations by users. At the time of violation, the PDP
invalidates the relevant session ID mappings by associating
existing session IDs with newly recomputed authorized geo-
spatial roles, if any, according to PrBAC policies. The PDP
then remotely informs the PEP of invalid mappings while
providing new authorized ones. The PDP can also alert the
enterprise’s administrators to take appropriate action. Such
a design makes the system completely automated by only
requiring users to be authenticated once by the AS.
6.4 Co-Proximity Authentication
Radio signals permeate through walls, and therefore it is
possible that two PMs located in two adjacent rooms may
detect the same Client device, even though in reality the
Client is located in one of the rooms. However, such signals
exhibit attenuation as they pass through walls. We leverage
this phenomena to determine the likelihood that a Client is
in a given room. In particular, we analyze the RSS values
from BLE beacons to initiate the co-proximity authentica-
tion process, which determines that a legitimate Client is
within a specific proximity zone.
Overview. The protocol to authenticate the user’s co-
proximity to a PM consists of two phases: the initialization
phase and the location authentication phase. First, the ini-
tialization phase establishes a temporary session key (SK)
securely shared and only accessible between a PM and a
Client. Next, the SK is later used in the location authenti-
cation phase, in which a timed challenge-response protocol is
executed. The crux of authenticating the user’s co-proximity
is analyzing the content of the beacon as well as the mea-
sured round trip time. We explain both phases in detail
below.
Initialization Phase. The initialization phase is acti-
vated once the user enters ∆2, that is, the concentric region
as indicated by BLE’s Near ranging measurement (i.e., be-
tween 1-3m from the PM as displayed in Figure 4). Placing
a PM at the center of an average sized conference room (e.g.,
∼6m x 6m) allows the PM to detect and monitor the move-
ments of any Client device that enters the room. In addition,
positioning in such a way may minimize the overlapping of
concentric regions of two adjacent PMs’ proximity zones.
Once the Client enters ∆2, the PM generates a temporary
SK and encrypts it with the Client’s public key. As stated in
Section 5, the public key can be retrieved from the authoriza-
tion server on demand or during the installation of the PM.
The SK is a one-time pad which consists of a string of bits
generated using a cryptographically secure pseudo-random
number generator. The encrypted SK (Step 1 in Figure 5) is
then sent to the Client via the AS, which is then decrypted
at the Client using the Client’s hardware-bound private key.
The Client finalizes the initialization phase by responding
with an acknowledgement of message receipt, which is re-
layed back to the PM. We note that there are a number of
methods to securely exchange temporary session keys. For
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in a conference room. The regions are virtually con-
structed using the ranging measurements of Blue-
tooth Low Energy: ∆1 and ∆2 is any position less
than 1m and between 1-3m, respectively.
Figure 5: CASSEC’s co-proximity authentication
protocol.
example, the PM could purely rely on BLE beacons to trans-
mit the encrypted SK, thereby minimizing communication
with the server. However, we did not choose this mode of
transmission because of limited data capacity in BLE bea-
con’s advertising data structures [43].
Authentication Phase. The PM will continue to mon-
itor and track the Client’s movements. The authentication
phase is activated once the user enters ∆1, that is, the
concentric region as indicated by BLE’s Immediate ranging
measurement (i.e., less than 1m from the PM). At this point,
the PM initiates a timed challenge-response protocol with
the target Client. The PM generates a fresh nonce (string
of random bits), embeds the nonce into a BLE beacon, and
transmits the beacon. Upon successful transmission, the
PM records the time of transmission and precomputes the
expected response. Upon reception, the Client calculates
an XOR value, using the nonce and the SK as the two in-
puts. XOR operations are simple and require minimal CPU
cycles to compute as opposed to other widely-used crypto-
graphic schemes with non-negligible encryption/decryption
times [24]. Leveraging XOR operations thus allows the Client
to minimize the time to calculate a response to the challenge,
and subsequently package and transmit the response within
a BLE beacon. Upon reception of the Client’s response bea-
con, the PM calculates the RTT value and verifies that the
precomputed value matches the received value. If the val-
ues match and the RTT is less than or equal to a speci-
fied threshold (RTTTH), the PM informs the AS that the
specific Client’s location has been authenticated with 100%
confidence, otherwise the PM and Client must repeat both
the initialization and authentication phases. We discuss how
we determined RTTTH in Section 8. Both phases must be
repeated since information about the temporary session key
that is generated in the initialization phase is leaked in the
authentication phase. An attacker can simply perform an
XOR of the nonce, which was transmitted in cleartext, and
the Client’s response beacon to calculate the session key.
To address circumstances resulting in proximity zones par-
tially overlapping, we take a binary approach. In the case
that multiple PMs detect and authenticate a Client via BLE
beacons simultaneously given that BLE beacons can travel
several meters, for simplicity, we classify a Client to be in
one of the corresponding rooms with 100% confidence only
if information sent by a PM meet two conditions: (1) the
RSS value (measured from the beacon) is the strongest of all
RSS values detected by other PMs; (2) the number of people
detected and captured UIDs match. Otherwise, there is 0%
confidence in the Client’s location. The left policy in Fig-
ure 2 provides an example of PrBAC policy that specifies
that the entity enforcing the policy must determine that the
General is in fact located in the GeneralsRoom with 100%
confidence to grant access to the TopSecretDocument.
6.5 Biometric Authentication
User verification via biometric authentication is isolated to
the only active component in our prototype system, that is,
the Client. We specifically develop an Android application
that leverages the smartphone’s capabilities to scan finger-
prints and measure acceleration in order to achieve phys-
iological and behavioral biometric authentication, respec-
tively. User verification is abstractly a two phase process
(see Section 3): the enrollment and authentication phases.
With respect to security, it is vital that enterprise admin-
istrators proctor the enrollment phase in-person to confirm
that biometric measurements taken by a Client device match
the true owner of the device. Fingerprint scanning and the
collection of walking traces are achieved and easily inte-
grated into our application using Android’s Fingerprint Au-
thentication and Sensor Manager APIs2. To ensure the pri-
vacy of users, the fingerprint and gait templates constructed
during the enrollment phase never leave the device.
We implemented the behavioral component of the user
verification framework in a similar fashion as proposed by
Ren et al. [34]. The framework consists of three components,
which can be abstracted to the enrollment and authentica-
tion phases previously mentioned: Step Cycle Identification,
Step Cycle Interpolation, and Similarity Comparison. The
components are built on the fact that human gait should be
cyclic in nature, and hence should exhibit high correlation.
Here, a step cycle is the period defined by the two consec-
utive heel strikes on the same leg (see Figure 6(a)). The
Step Cycle Identification component identifies step cycles
in a walking trace, and then uses the extracted features to
2We do not elaborate on implementation details as Android
provides detailed instructions and samples to utilize Android
Fingerprint Authentication and acceleration measuring [4].
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Figure 6: 6(a) is an illustration of a complete gait cycle from the initial heel strike to the terminal heel
strike (from [39]). 6(b) displays preliminary measurements of accelerometer signals of a walking trace in the
vertical direction we collected using a Nexus 6P smartphone. Orange lines indicate step cycles identified by
heel strike impacts.
construct and store a biometric template. Although smart-
phone accelerometers provide signals in three dimensions,
the framework extracts only the signals from the vertical
direction to identify impacts caused by heel strikes. Figure
6(b) displays a walking trace with identified cyclical heel
strike impacts. Users usually walk at varying speeds, which
would negatively impact the verification process if the tem-
plate and the runtime measurements are of traces with dif-
ferent speeds. Addressing this potential problem, the Step
Cycle Interpolation phase enables robust user verification
by normalizing identified step cycles of different lengths into
fixed lengths. Figure 7 displays the interpolated accelerom-
eter signals, recorded using a Nexus 6P, of slow (slower than
0.7 m/s), normal (about 0.7 - 1.1 m/s), and fast (about 1.1
- 1.4 m/s) walking traces to a fixed length of 400 samples.
The figure demonstrates that step cycles are highly corre-
lated regardless of walking speed. Last, user authentication
is performed in the Similarity Comparison phase, which uti-
lizes a weighted Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) based
method.
We apply defense-in-depth within the authentication phase.
We first use Pearson correlation coefficients when comput-
ing the similarity between the gait template and the walking
trace runtime measurements. Users are only verified if sim-
ilarity scores are above a predefined threshold (see Section
7.4). If similarity scores fall below the threshold, the user
is then required to perform authentication via fingerprint
scanner when the user attempts to access the phone. We
are unable to set a threshold for fingerprint authentication
as we rely on the Client device’s integrated fingerprint solu-
tion. If the user neither can be verified via behavioral nor
physiological biometric authentication, the Client ensures
that sensitive enterprise content is inaccessible by locking
the device3. In addition, the Client can alert enterprise ad-
ministrators for possible user spoofing.
3We build an application on the Client using Android’s De-
vice Administration API, which includes the device lock
ability [4].
Figure 7: Step cycle interpolation applied to walk-
ing traces collected using our Nexus 6P smartphone
at three different speeds: slow, normal, and fast.
7. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
7.1 The ECS
The ECS was implemented in PHP and hosted on a re-
mote commercial server. The resources that it could serve
to Clients were simple text files. We implemented user inter-
faces (UI) in order for Clients to request access to specific
files. The ECS provides a function that can be remotely
invoked via URL: sessAuth(mappings). The function is in-
voked by the AS to update the ECS regarding the active
geo-spatial roles for Clients in the event that location up-
dates reflect proximity violations.
7.2 The AS
The AS was also implemented in PHP and hosted on
the same server as the ECS. We implemented the UI in
order for Clients to pass in authentication credentials via
a login page. The AS provides two functions that can be
remotely invoked via URLs: auth(user,psswd) and addEn-
try(pzoneID,numOfPpl, UIDs+RSSs, time). The first func-
tion is invoked by a Client via the UI and the second is
invoked by the PM to update proximity information within
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the context database.
7.3 The PM
As in any basic positioning system, a PM incorporates a
transmitter and a receiver. We define a transmitter as a
wireless-enabled device that is a source of contextual infor-
mation regarding the occupants within a proximity zone. A
receiver is a wireless-enabled device that acts as a sink for
such contextual information.
We utilize BLE-enabled smartphones and WiFi access points
(APs) as transmitters. In regards to smartphones, we em-
bed three values into BLE beacons to support co-proximity
authentication. Generally, these devices periodically broad-
cast their 48-bit Bluetooth MAC addresses with a less than
10 meter range indoors when Bluetooth is enabled. How-
ever, since Android 6.0, the MAC address found in a BLE
beacon is replaced with a random value at various inter-
vals to protect user privacy [4]. User privacy is not a con-
cern within the enterprise scenarios that CASSEC targets.
Disabling this feature would require modifying the Android
OS, which reduces the deployability of our solution. There-
fore, we cannot rely on this hardware address to identify
users. Instead, in CASSEC 2.0, we embed a 48-bit UID
into BLE’s local name data structure using Android’s Blue-
toothAdapter.getDefaultAdapter().setName(UID). The BLE
beacon data protocol is limited with respect to the amount of
custom data we are able to embed within a beacon. As a re-
sult, the nonce, as well as the one-time pad SK generated by
the PM, is restricted to 12-bytes. With the remaining space,
we embed a 16-byte service UUID which enables Clients and
Proximity Modules to communicate under a beacon service.
We require that users of the system permanently enable their
smartphones’ Bluetooth. Such a requirement can be easily
enforced by Enterprise Mobility Management services [31].
WiFi APs transmit data over signals that can be measured.
However, such signals are significantly influenced by the en-
vironment. We rely on the interference of signals as a result
of human activity to determine the number of occupants in
a proximity zone.
The PM was implemented as two physical devices: a Pixel
C tablet running Android Oreo (API 26 v8.0) and a lap-
top using Python running Linux. For brevity, we refer to
these devices as simply the PM. The PM was charged with
periodically scanning signals produced by BLE and WiFi
devices. Beacon scan settings were set to SCAN MODE -
LOW LATENCY from the ScanSettings API, while WiFi
signals were scanned every 10 seconds. The PM extracts
the UIDs of beacons from nearby occupants’ smartphones.
The UIDs are used as proof-of-location once co-proximity
authentication has been established, which determines who
is in a given space. The PM also measures the received signal
strength from a designated WiFi AP. The receiver processes
the measured WiFi RSS value and determines how many
occupants are in a given space. Last, the receiver publishes
the UIDs, beacon RSS values, and the number of occupants
to the authorization server only when previously collected
contextual information changes.
We note that the various components of the CASSEC’s
system architecture can be integrated into the same physical
component when implemented. For example, a smartphone
mobile device can act both as Client and transmitter be-
cause the same device used to request access to a resource is
the same device that periodically broadcasts its Bluetooth
data structures. Similarly, a desktop terminal can act both
as Client and receiver because it can also be used to scan
and process WiFi and Bluetooth contextual information.
7.4 Use Case
In this section, we evaluate features of the CASSEC 2.0
prototype system in order to provide clear insights into ad-
dressing the issues raised in Section 2. We measure the
performance of the system’s biometric and co-proximity au-
thentication components to prove the feasibility of securing
enterprise content under a proximity-based access control
model.
7.4.1 Deployment
We deployed our hardware and tested our prototype sys-
tem in a two bedroom apartment whose layout is shown in
Figure 8. We now briefly describe the hardware utilized in
our platform.
Figure 8: The blueprint of a two-bedroom apart-
ment in which the prototype system had been de-
ployed. The blue markers and green markers indi-
cate the positions of WiFi access points and laptops,
respectively. The dotted lines indicate the two pos-
sible positions for each human, and transitions sim-
ply require moving two steps without changing body
orientation. The red dots represent the current po-
sitions of the humans standing still while facing the
laptop.
The Wireless-N (802.11n) WiFi AP transmitter was a Mo-
torola SURFBoard SBG6580, indicated in blue, that sup-
ports two frequency bands which are 2.5GHz and 5.0GHz.
We chose the higher-frequency band to take advantage of
additional channels that are less prone to interference than
2.4GHz. The receiver was a Dell Latitude E6430, indicated
in green, equipped with a BCM4313 802.11bgn wireless net-
work adapter and a Dell Wireless 380 Bluetooth 4.0. The
transmitter and the receiver were placed 3 meters apart
and were elevated 1 meter above the floor. The Bluetooth-
enabled transmitters used in our study were Samsung S3
GT-i9300 and Nexus 6P. The Nexus 6P, which has a finger-
print scanner and an accelerometer that supports a 200Hz
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sampling rate, was used for biometric collection and analy-
sis.
7.4.2 Use Case Evaluations
Evaluation 1: Selecting Frequency Channel. Given
a wireless link between a transmitter and a receiver, an in-
dividual crossing the line of sight between the two commu-
nicating wireless sensors affects the RSS measured by the
receiver. However, the change in RSS depends on the fre-
quency channel [10]. Our goal is to determine which channel
is the best for detecting human activity based on our par-
ticular WiFi-enabled devices. We test 2 non-overlapping
40MHz channels: Channel A (5180MHz) and Channel B
(5220MHz). The experimental setup is as follows. Through-
out the complete test, we continuously measure the RSS
value sampling twice per second. Every 30 seconds we change
the number of individuals obstructing the LOS by 1 start-
ing from zero to two, and then in a decreasing fashion. The
occupants were situated equidistant from each receiver. A
Python script was written to automatically begin the test.
The tests were conducted in Bedroom 1.
The results in Figure 9 demonstrate that there is no signif-
icant difference in measurement variation in human-induced
interference in RSS signals between Channel A and Channel
B. At first, Channel A appears to be more consistent as the
level of signal interference in samples 60 - 120 aligns with
values in samples 180 - 240 when the number of individuals
increases from zero to one and two to one, respectively. This
is not observed in Channel B during that period. However,
the values for Channel A appear to indicate the presence
of a number of individuals different from the number of in-
dividuals actually present from samples 330 onward. This
fluctuation is not observed in Channel B. Although Figure
9 shows the results of only one complete test, we performed
this test 3 times and observed similar changes in values.
Given these observations, we select Channel B as a means
for testing in the rest of the study.
We also make some general observations about human-
induced RSS changes. We observed distinct variances in
signal strength almost every 30 seconds (multiple of 60 units
in Figure 9). First, by initiating the test with no individu-
als obstructing the LOS, we were able to establish a baseline
for the signal strength between the transmitter and receiver.
The RSS value remained always constant within that time
period up until to two seconds after the 30 second mark.
That is, using our existing hardware, we were able to de-
termine that once we increase the number of individuals by
one, the individuals must remain in the LOS for at least one
second for the receiver to observe some interference from
human activity. Such phenomena was also observed at the
beginning or end of each period. Second, regardless of the
selected channel, when the LOS is obstructed by an individ-
ual the RSS on average decreases. In addition, distinct dBm
drop ranges exist depending on the number of individuals.
Therefore we can infer the presence or absence of humans
based on RSS’ ranges. For example, in Channel A, we con-
sistently observed a drop range of 6-8 dBm between 30-60,
90-120, 150-180, and 210-240 seconds. We note that our ob-
servations are likely to change using different WiFi-enabled
hardware.
Evaluation 2: WiFi Detection Accuracy. The goal
here is to test the WiFi localization component of our PM.
Specifically, we implemented a simple algorithm to detect
Location Detection
Bedroom1 89%
Bedroom2 43%
Table 2: We leverage the human-induced signal in-
terference in WiFi received signal strength (RSS)
to detect occupancy within a monitored room. 89%
and 48% accuracy was achieved for Bedroom 1 and 2,
respectively. We believe that detection accuracy in
the latter case were low because our technique was
based on data acquired in Evaluation 1 which ana-
lyzed signal interference from Bedroom 1. Specifi-
cally, we believe that there were other unseen envi-
ronmental factors that influenced the RSS values of
human activity in Bedroom 2.
the number of people within the LOS based on our obser-
vations of human-induced RSS changes from Evaluation 1.
The setup to this test is similar to the setup for Evaluation
1, except that we perform the test in both Bedrooms 1 and
2. We conduct the test on Channel B.
Table 2 displays the results. The system was able to de-
tect with strong accuracy (89%) the number of occupants
obstructing the line of sight in Bedroom 1. At certain points,
sporadic fluctuations occurred that caused the system to re-
turn an incorrect number. On the other hand, the system
was only able to detect occupancy with 44% accuracy in
Bedroom 2. After further analysis (by performing Evalua-
tion 1 in Bedroom 2), we observed the human-induced in-
terference was slightly different in RSS levels. Although the
physical layouts of Bedroom 1 and 2 are identical, there may
be other (unseen) environmental factors that also influenced
the RSS levels to slightly differ between the two rooms. For
example, such factors may include overlapping wireless net-
works (possibly using the same channel) from neighboring
apartments, appliances and electronics emitting radio fre-
quency interference, and simply walls and floors blocking
wireless signals in different ways depending on the location
of access points [6]. We leave further analysis of WiFi sig-
nal interference caused by various environmental factors for
future work.
Evaluation 3: Gait Recognition Detection Latency.
The goal here is to determine the required length of a walk-
ing trace to identify the true owner of a Client device using
gait recognition. CASSEC was developed with certain en-
terprises in mind that desire high assurances that sensitive
enterprise content on end-users’ devices is well protected.
We therefore set the pre-defined threshold to 0.8. A single
user participated in this study using a Nexus 6P smartphone
device to record and analyze accelerometer values. In order
to execute the test, the user performed the enrollment and
authentication phases. We first collected from the user six
60-second walking traces at normal speed: the first and sub-
sequent five traces to be used for gait template construction
and runtime measurements in the enrollment and authenti-
cation phases, respectively. Then, in the enrollment phase,
n, n = 5, 6, ...60, gait templates were constructed for the
user which were derived from extracting n seconds from the
first trace. Next, in the authentication phase, we extracted
n seconds from each of the subsequent traces to analyze and
compare biometric templates with run-time measurements
that are of corresponding lengths. In its entirety, we re-
peated this test twice; differentiating the two by placement
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Figure 9: RSS measurements of wireless links on different frequency bands when human bodies obstruct the
line of sight (LOS). The blue circles indicate the number of humans in the LOS within each 60-sample period
(i.e., every 30 seconds).
of the smartphone device: on the hip and within the pocket.
Figure 10 displays the results of the test. We first note
that all similarity scores produced were at least greater or
equal to the predefined threshold. On average, the system
was able to detect that the current user of the Client de-
vice is the true owner with approximately 91% and 89%
confidence (i.e., similarity score) when the phone is placed
on the hip and within the pocket, respectively. The system
only required five seconds of each walking trace to make such
an assertion. We also observe that longer traces eventually
produce higher levels of confidence in identifying the true
owner because more gait features were extracted, and there-
fore more identifying features can be determined during the
authentication phase.
Extracting more gait features over a longer period of time
produces higher levels of confidence while in the pocket as
compared to on the hip. Upon further analysis of individ-
ual traces from both the hip and pocket, it appears that hip
traces have increased oscillations that are not quite periodic.
Particularly, we observed that there are more variations in-
between the heel strikes as compared to pocket traces. First,
the Step Cycle Identification component may falsely identify
when the user’s leg comes in contact with the ground if os-
cillations closely resembles heel strikes. Second, the gait
recognition program assumes a cyclic nature, and thus if no
repetition occurs within these sporadic oscillations, correct
heel strikes, which occur outside of the oscillations, may not
be properly analyzed as well. It is evident that the hip is
continuously gyrating, and therefore, has a periodic motion.
However, we believe that the increased (and erroneous) vari-
ations are the result of the method in which we attached
the device to the hip. While the device is securely fastened
and flushed with the hip clip in order to minimize erroneous
movement of the device, it is difficult to replicate such a
secure grip with the hip clip itself as it is attached to the
wearer’s clothing. However, while placed in the pocket, the
device is resistant to minor shuffling because it is pressed
against the user’s clothing and leg. Nevertheless, the re-
sults of this test demonstrate that feasibility to detect the
true owner of the Client device with high confidence when
placed within the pocket or attached to the hip, even con-
sidering the inherent erroneous data that is acquired while
the device is attached to the hip.
As stated in Section 1 and Section 3, the development of
gait recognition techniques for user verification is outside the
scope of this work. We emphasize that this work is a feasi-
bility study that demonstrates the application of biometric
techniques such as gait authentication to securing enterprise
content under a proximity-based access control model solely
using one mobile device. We refer readers to the work by
Ren et al. [34] for an extensive user evaluation of the gait
authentication technique we have leveraged.
Figure 10: Average similarity score by varying the
duration of user profile trace and runtime measure-
ment trace.
Evaluation 4: Robustness Against Different Walk-
ing Speeds. The goal here is to test the robustness of the
system against various walking speeds. We applied the same
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methodology as Evaluation 3 with an exception. We also
compare the biometric template constructed from the nor-
mal walking trace to five runtime measurements collected
from the user for both slow and fast walking speeds.
Figure 11 displays the results of the test. We achieved a
100% detection rate with a threshold of 0.8 when similar-
ity score calculations were derived from the normal and fast
walking traces. However, in a few instances, our system was
unable to authenticate the current user as the true owner of
the device. 07% of the similarity scores calculated, which we
consider negligible, fell within the range of [0.7,0.8). Never-
theless, we can observe in any walking trace, including the
slow walking trace, that there is a positive correlation be-
tween the trace length and the similarity scores produced.
That is, the system can reliably determine the user with
increasing confidence over a longer period of time.
Figure 11: Average similarity score calculated by
comparing the normal walking biometric template
with both the slow and fast runtime measurement
walking traces.
Evaluation 5: Capturing BLE Beacon RTT Values.
One type of distance-bounding technique uses the elapsed
time between two devices for distance estimation. Our goal
for this test is to apply such a technique to BLE and de-
termine if indeed that the round trip time of beacons is a
function of distance. We exchanged beacons between two
BLE-capable devices (Pixel C tablet and Nexus 6P smart-
phone) and recorded 100 RTT values at various distances.
The devices were laid down across a wooden desk with the
front screen facing upwards. Figure 12 shows the distri-
bution of RTT values measured between the two devices.
We note that displayed values reflect distance estimation as
implemented in our co-proximity authentication. We first
observed that most of the RTT values, at each distance, are
centered around the median (the black line within the in-
ner quartile range). For example, at distances of 1ft, 4ft,
and 6ft, the RTT values are centered around approximately
81ms (± 1ms), while at a distance of 2ft, RTT values are
centered around 77ms. We also observed that the IQR, the
box that spans the first and third quartiles, are centered in
between 72ms and 86ms. Consequently, no significant sta-
tistical variations of RTT values exist when the PM and the
Client device executed the timed challenge-response protocol
at distances between 1-6ft. Moreover, we produced similar
results when we applied the same experimental process, but
instead separated the devices with a 1ft wall. We discuss
the security implications in Section 8.
Figure 12: A boxplot diagram showing the distribu-
tion of round trip time of 100 Bluetooth Low En-
ergy beacons each at various distances, exchanged
between a Proximity Module and a Client.
8. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a security analysis of our CASSEC
platform to analyze attacks aiming at circumventing its PrBAC
restrictions. Below, we provide various attack vectors that
could be used and, subsequently, a means to mitigate the
threat or minimize the attack vector surface.
8.1 Bluetooth Manipulation
In our previous work, when a PM publishes a MAC ad-
dress to the PIP, it attests that a specific individual is at
a specific proximity zone. A malicious user may attempt
to root his/her device and modify the MAC address in or-
der to impersonate another user of the system. In this pa-
per, however, such malicious modification of MAC addresses
would do no harm for two reasons: (1) we rely on UIDs that
are dynamically embedded into data structures within BLE
beacons; and (2) Android Oreo (API 26 v8.0) automatically
randomizes the MAC addresses of beacons. Moreover, an
attacker that roots his device to dynamically alter beacon
UIDs (through a modified and unauthorized custom OS)
to impersonate a legitimate user would fail the challenge-
response protocol for several reasons including the attacker’s
inability to access the legitimate user’s private key, which
is bound to the user’s Client device hardware (i.e., not ex-
portable). In addition, Samsung has demonstrated via Sam-
sung KNOX 2.0, a custom Android OS intended for enter-
prise environments [31], hardware and software security fea-
tures that leave the device inoperable once it detects a root
attack, which is a sufficient mechanism to defend against
malicious modification of the OS.
One attack that malicious users may attempt is masking
their smartphones’ Bluetooth peripheral services by either
disabling the Bluetooth or simply leaving the device in an-
other room. Although we require that Bluetooth be per-
manently enabled on users’ devices, we do not incorporate
an enforcement mechanism within the phone to meet such
requirement. However, our system is able to detect if the
violation of such requirement occurs. The WiFi localization
technique is able to determine the number of occupants in
the room. If the number of occupants and the number of
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UIDs, which are published to the PIP, for a given room do
not match, the PDP will infer such malicious behaviour and
subsequently revoke access to resources. In addition, appro-
priate actions can be taken by the system administrator. We
also note that Android provides Device Administrator APIs
for BYOD scenarios, which allow enterprises to take control
of sensitive resources and modify system configurations on
their employees’ devices. Through such APIs, an enterprise
can then permanently enable Bluetooth services.
Another attack vector involves an unauthorized individ-
ual obtaining an authorized user’s phone, whether by theft
or voluntary provision. If such an attack occurs, then the
unauthorized individual can gain access to restricted re-
sources. In reality, this sort of attack exploits social engi-
neering and/or insider threats that are usually already cov-
ered as part of an enterprise’s global security efforts. Nev-
ertheless, in our extended system, we mitigate this previ-
ously unaddressed attack vector by incorporating mecha-
nisms that are able to determine biometric signatures for
every user in the system. In particular, we employ behav-
ioral (i.e., dynamic gait analysis) and physiological (i.e., fin-
gerprint analysis) biometric authentication, which ensures
that unauthorized users will not be able to bypass security
by using someone else’s device.
One of the objectives of our paper is to address context
monitoring issues including adversarial context manipula-
tion via passive attacks (e.g., malicious relay of BLE bea-
cons). However, we emphasize that if we relax assumptions
stated in Section 5 and elevate the adversary’s capabilities
to active attacks, we envision two active attack vectors the
adversary could employ that would not circumvent the se-
curity of the system: packet injection and Denial-of-Service
(DoS). An astute active attacker would determine that an
advantage cannot be gained by injecting packets at either
Step 3 or Step 4 of the co-proximity authentication proto-
col (Figure 5). Intercepting the BLE beacon that encap-
sulates nonce at Step 3 and transmitting a new malicious
beacon that encapsulates a nonce’, which would be now re-
ceived by the Client, is unnecessary. The original nonce is
transmitted in cleartext, thereby allowing the adversary to
simply record the observed value, which may be potentially
used in Step 4. However, the attacker again would not need
to inject packets in Step 4 since the attacker has acquired
the information needed (i.e., nonce) to extract and calcu-
late the temporary session key (SK) from the BLE beacon
sent by the Client. Knowledge of nonce and SK also does
not violate the security of the system (see Section 6.4). In
summary, injecting attacker-generated BLE beacons would
serve no purpose towards the goal of fooling the CASSEC
2.0 system into establishing co-proximity between the PM
and the Client.
Given that intercepting and subsequently injecting mali-
cious BLE beacons between the PM and the Client would
serve no purpose towards circumventing co-proximity au-
thentication, an active attacker may instead rely on DoS
attacks. A malicious user may attempt a DoS attack by ac-
quiring a high-powered Bluetooth-enabled device [8, 13, 42].
Specifically, the user first adjusts the special device to mimic
his original (or another user’s) smartphone’s UID, and then
boosts the signal strength. As a consequence, receivers in
different rooms within a certain radius may incorrectly pub-
lish the proof-of-location. Therefore, the PDP will believe
that multiple violations are occurring. First, the system is
inherently resistant to such attack. Because of signal attenu-
ation, proximity modules, which have lower transmission ca-
pabilities than of the adversary’s high-powered device, may
not be able to transmit the challenge beacon to the mali-
cious device, which may be potentially far from the prox-
imity module. However, if reception of the challenge does
occur, several methods could be employed to counteract this
attack. For example, our study shows that the majority of
beacon RTT values fell between 72ms and 86ms. The PM
could invalidate the challenge, thereby invalidating the cor-
responding response, after 86ms has elapsed. We emphasize
that we are describing this DoS attack under the assumption
that the attacker is able to somehow relay the temporary
session key (once it has been decrypted) from his Client to
the special device, otherwise the objective of the DoS attack
would be to simply waste computing resources by repeatedly
initiating the co-proximity authentication process.
The results in Section 7.4 demonstrated that no signifi-
cant statistical variations of RTT values exist when the PM
and the Client device executed co-proximity authentication
at distances between 1-6ft. Consequently, time-based dis-
tance estimation techniques that rely on BLE beacons as its
underlying technology are not reliable methods for differenti-
ating between adjacent proximity zones within an enterprise
environment. However, such techniques may be resistant to
an adversary’s attempts to execute relay attacks when the
Client is far away, that is, outside the enterprise environ-
ment. Let us assume the adversary’s attack takes the form
of a ghost-and-leech attack vector [21] in which the adver-
sary employs two relay devices ( APM, AC) that are each
within 6ft of the PM and the Client, respectively, and the
two malicious devices communicate over a high-speed con-
nection. Let us also assume that APM and AC have sim-
ilar hardware and software to that of the Client and PM,
respectively. The total RTT (RTTT ) is the sum of the RTT
values between the PM and APM (RTTPM ), APM and
AC (RTTPMC), which consists of RTT values between the
network communication nodes that support the high speed
connection, and AC and the Client (RTTC). The communi-
cation relationship between said entities is visually depicted
as:
PM — APM · · · AC — Client
RTTT = RTTPM + RTTPMC + RTTC
It is difficult to approximate RTTPM and RTTPMC be-
cause their values are significantly influenced by and depen-
dent on many factors (e.g., communication nodes’ connec-
tion medium, network traffic load, propagation delay, etc.).
However, since the beacon transmission between AC and
Client simulates the transmission between the PM and the
Client as consequence of employing similar hardware and
software, we are able to approximate RTTC to 81ms based
on our study. In addition, the triangle inequality theorem
ensures us that RTTPM +RTTPMC > RTTC since the path
from the PM to the Client is not a direct route. Thus, the
RTT threshold (RTTTH) should be set to 81ms for each
legitimate proximity module to prevent relay attacks when
the Client is outside the enterprise environment.
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8.2 WiFi Manipulation
We leverage the WiFi signal interference caused by hu-
man activity to determine the number of occupants in a
given room. A malicious user could attempt a DoS by dis-
rupting WiFi signals. That is, an attacker could acquire a
special device that would, for example, completely nullify
WiFi signals [8, 13, 42]. Another means to circumvent the
system would be to obstruct the LOS with something other
than a human body such as a chair. Therefore, in either
case, when the receiver processes the signal interference, it
may publish an incorrect number of users within that room.
However, the authorization server will detect violations be-
cause inconsistencies will exist within the PIP.
Regardless of whether Bluetooth or WiFi manipulation
is employed, the scenarios that we address make it more
difficult to circumvent CASSEC. That is, in both the SoD
Scenario and the AOU scenario, multiple users with mutual
interests must collude and agree in order to attempt bypass-
ing the system.
8.3 True Continuous Authentication
Our passive biometric authentication scheme only pro-
vides continuous authentication while the Client smartphone
device is within the user’s pocket. It is possible that an
authorized user, whom the Client had previously authenti-
cated, simply removes the device from the pocket, and sub-
sequently gives the device to an unauthorized user. Con-
sequently, the device is unlocked and its content is acces-
sible by the unauthorized user. Therefore, other biometric
authentication must be used. While there are both active
and passive biometric authentication solutions, passive so-
lutions should be used to maximize usability as they would
not require users to actively authenticate themselves. To
protect against such an attack, other passive biometric tech-
niques to continually authenticate while the user is hold-
ing the phone should be used. Some biometric features
that could be analyzed and passively authenticated include
timing of keystrokes, touchscreen behavior, face, retina, or
iris [2, 35, 37]. In fact, passive facial recognition technology
has been recently (Nov, 2017) integrated into the Apple’s
new flagship mobile device: iPhone X [5].
9. RELATED WORK
The role-based access control (RBAC) model is mainly
used in enterprise settings to facilitate administration of ac-
cess control polices [16]. In such settings, users are assigned
different roles whereby each role is granted predefined ac-
cess privileges to enterprise resources. Various access control
models and systems have been proposed that use RBAC as
a foundational paradigm, and some augment the model so
that privileges associated with a role can only be exercised
if contextual parameters are adhered to. The most common
extension is the inclusion of spatial constraints. GEO-RBAC
is a spatially-aware RBAC model that defines the concept of
spatial roles which allow an authorized user to assume a role
(i.e., role enabling) and exercise its associated privileges (i.e.,
role activation) only if the user is at or within a designated
location specified by physical coordinates [9]. LoT-RBAC
and STARBAC are other augmented RBAC models that in-
corporates spatio-temporal constraints for role enabling and
role activation [1,12]. Such models, however, are not imple-
mented and therefore no enforcement mechanism has been
developed to support these models.
Proximity-based Access Control (PBAC) [19] is an access
control model developed specifically for Smart-Emergency
Environments that takes into account the user’s proximity
to a resource (e.g., a computer). Prox-RBAC, which extends
GEO-RBAC, is a formal authorization model based on a
notion of proximity [23]. That is, access control decisions
are not solely based on the requesting user’s location, but
also on the location of other users in the physical space.
Prox-RBAC incorporates elements of the UCONABC usage
control model [32]. Prox-RBAC has been further extended
to incorporate a large variety of proximity constraints in
addition to the spatial ones, namely attribute-based, social,
cyber, and temporal proximity constraints [18].
Prox-RBAC was implemented using near-field communi-
cation (NFC) allowing a NFC-enabled phone to transmit
signals to a NFC reader to lock and unlock a door. Although
it provides high-integrity proof of location, it requires user
intervention; the user must initiate close-quarters contact
between the phone and the NFC reader. Integration of NFC
capabilities has become standard in state-of-the-art smart-
phones, and therefore, an enterprise would be required to
expend financial resources to deploy NFC readers for each
door in the enterprise setting to fully deploy the Prox-RBAC
system. On the other hand, PBAC was implemented using
ultra-wide band RFID which calculated AoA and ToA to
support automated access access control. Although the sys-
tem did not require user intervention, active tags (worn by
users) and mounted receivers had to be deployed to deter-
mine the tags position. Similarly, an enterprise would incur
costs to deploy the PBAC system. Moreover, many sys-
tems, including Prox-RBAC and PBAC, inherently assume
that every individual within a monitored space is trusted.
Systems that are solely based on location tracking devices
worn or held by users can be easily circumvented through
collusion. Consider the two motivating scenarios discussed
in Section 2 on which our work is based. In the SoD scenario,
which assumes top secret documents to be stored within a
protected office, one of the Generals that has a high security
clearance will unlock the door with his/her tracking device
(e.g., NFC), but a Private can easily follow immediately be-
hind prior to the door locking. By not initiating contact
between the transmitter and the receiver, the system would
be tricked into believing that no unauthorized personnel is
occupying the protected office. The AOU scenario requires
that an eyes-only, restricted document to be accessible by a
Private only when no other individuals are in the vicinity.
However, a Civilian, assuming he/she was given a tracking
device, can simply remove the device (e.g., active tag) so
as to not be tracked. In addition, costs for deployment and
management of these systems, and others used in similar
architectures, remain significant and limit the widespread
adoption of these systems. Unlike CASSEC 2.0, neither
Prox-RBAC or PBAC addressed a major security problem
of a user obtaining an authorized user’s phone, whether by
theft or voluntary provision. Consequently, individuals may
be able to circumvent the access control system via collu-
sion, allowing one individual to impersonate another individ-
ual by exchanging tracking devices. Various solutions have
been proposed to prevent such an attack, but require special
hardware to deploy [2]. The approach by Wang et al. [41],
for example, explores biometric signatures using WiFi-based
techniques, but it requires one receiver and one transmitter
for every user in order to distinguish multiple subjects at
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a time, which is not practical for enterprise environments.
Instead, our goal is to utilize commodity hardware widely
available in enterprise environments: smartphone devices.
In CASSEC 2.0, we leverage the accelerometer and finger-
print sensors within smartphones to achieve physiological
and behavioral biometric authentication, and thereby en-
abling our system the ability to determine with high con-
fidence whether the current user is the true owner of the
device.
XACML is a standardized access control policy language
and an abstract enforcement model. In our work, we lever-
age the syntactical structure of XACML policies (specified
in XML) as well as the main components in its enforcement
mechanism. Specifically, our policy specification is written
in XML (Section 4), and our underlying PrBAC reference
architecture is the same as the one of XACML. However, the
communication model as well as the duties of each architec-
tural component differ in CASSEC 2.0 as our objective is
to provide an abstract context-aware system architecture to
support an automated access control system.
10. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a proximity-based context-aware
access control mechanism that also incorporates constraints
concerning the confidence about user and location infor-
mation. Such constraints allow the system to make de-
cisions based on the degree of reliability of extracted con-
textual information. We have integrated such mechanisms
into CASSEC 2.0 and have conducted a feasibility study to
show our approach is viable in practice. We have evaluated
our confidence constructs and collected some data by im-
plementing behavioral and physiological biometric authen-
tication and extending the occupancy detection mechanism
with a robust co-proximity authentication protocol that is
resistant against relay attacks. Currently, the biometric
authentication component leverages both passive and ac-
tive techniques. Active techniques require user intervention
(e.g., requesting the user to place his finger on a fingerprint
reader), which may negatively impact the user experience
and user workplace productivity. Even more, such active
techniques only authenticate the legitimate user at the time
of access, thereby possibly enabling an unauthorized user,
who is in proximity to the legitimate user, to gain access to
restricted resources subsequent to initial authentication (see
Section 8). To maximize the usability and security of the
solution, we plan to extend CASSEC 2.0 to support multi-
factor passive biometric authentication in order to achieve
true continuous authentication, which would allow on-going
user verification while data is being accessed.
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